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The United States Supreme Court remarked in 1851 that the
doctrine of punitive damages' was so well-entrenched in our legal
system that the question of the propriety of awarding punitive
damages "will not admit of argument."'2 Despite the Court's confident
assertion, punitive damages have admitted of argument in recent
years; they have been both exalted and assailed.
' This article was first published in 31 HASTINGS L.J. 639 (1980). For citation
purposes please refer to the original source of the material.
*Assistant Professor, School of Business, Indiana University. B.A., 1971, Indiana
University; J.D., 1976, Indiana University School of Law.
** Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, University of North Carolina. B.A., 1970,
Pennsylvania State University; J.D., 1973, University of Pennsylvania Law School; LL.M.,
1976, Harvard University School of Law.
1. Punitive damages, also referred to as "exemplary," "vindictive," "punitory,"
"smart money," and "presumptive" damages, "are sums awarded apart from any
compensatory or nominal damages, usually as punishment or deterrent levied because of
particularly aggravated misconduct on the part of the defendant." D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.9, at 204 (1973) [hereinafter cited as DOBBS]. The type of
aggravated misconduct about which Professor Dobbs speaks generally is deemed to have
occurred where the defendant has committed a malicious, wanton, or intentional tort, or a
reckless offense in disregard of the rights or safety or others. See Roberts v. Pierce, 398
F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1968); Morgan v. Bates, 390 P.2d 486 (Okla. 1964); RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 908 (1939); DOBBS, supra, at 206; Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts,
70 HARV. L. REv. 517 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Exemplary Damages]; Note, The
Assessment of Punitive Damages Against an Entrepreneur for the Malicious Torts of His
Employees, 70 YALE L.J. 1896 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Malicious Torts]. One court has
stated: "'To entitle a plaintiff to recover exemplary damages in an action sounding in tort,
the proof must show some element of fraud, malice, or oppression. The act which
constitutes the cause of action must be actuated by, or accompanied with, some evil intent,
or must be the result of such gross negligence, such disregard of another's rights, as is
deemed equivalent to such intent."' Morgan v. Bates, 390 P.2d 486-488 (Okla. 1964)
(quoting syllabus to Keener Oil & Gas Co. v. Stewart, 172 Okla. 143, 45 P.2d 121 (1935)).
Moreover, they are never granted as a matter of right but fall solely within the discretion
of the jury. Crea v. Wuellner, 235 Minn. 408, 51 N.W.2d 283 (1952).
2. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363,371 (1851).
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On one hand, many modem courts have expanded the
application of punitive damages beyond the traditional malicious tort
framework to include cases involving bad faith breach of contract
claims,3 violations of civil rights,4 fraudulent violations of state
securities laws,5 and products liability actions.6 On the other hand,
forceful arguments have been made 7 that the doctrine of punitive
3. See, e.g., Jones v. Abriani, 350 N.E.2d 635 (Ind. App. 1976); Vernon Fire & Cas.
Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 161 Ind. App. 413, 316 N.E.2d 381 (1974), modified on other grounds,
264 Ind. 599, 349 N.E.2d 173 (1976). See generally Sullivan, Punitive Damages in the Law
of Contract: The Reality and the Illusion of Legal Change, 61 MINN. L. REV. 207 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Sullivan]; Exemplary Damages, supra note 1, at 531-33; Note, The
Expanding Availability of Punitive Damages in Contract Actions, 8 IND. L. REv. 668
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Punitive Damages in Contract Actions]; Comment, Exemplary
Damages in Contract Cases, 7 WILLIAMETTE LJ. 137 (1971).
4. See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 233-34 (1970) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); Zarcone v. Perry, 572 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1978); Fountila v. Carter, 571 F.2d 487
(9th Cir. 1978); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 204-05 (2d Cir. 1971). But see LaReau v.
Manson, 383 F. Supp. 214,219 (D. Conn. 1974). See generally Comment, Implying Punitive
Damages in Employment Discrimination Cases, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 325 (1974).
5. See Comment, Punitive Damages and the Federal Securities Act Recovery Via
Pendent Jurisdiction, 47 MISS. L.J. 743, 759-67 (1976), where the authors state that, while
punitive damages are not available under the federal securities laws, the prevailing trend
allows recovery when a state claim is joined under pendent jurisdiction. See also
Comment, Punitive Damages for Securities Regulation, 8 HOUS. L. REV. 137, 149-54
(1970) (criticizing the disallowance of punitive damages under the federal securities laws).
6. See, e.g., Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398
(1967). Cf. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967) (evidence
insufficient to impose punitive damages in drug products liability action); Moore v. Jewel
Tea Co., 116 Ill. App. 2d 109, 253 N.E.2d 636 (1969), affd, 46 Ill. 2d 288, 263 N.E.2d 103
(1970) (punitive damages award against manufacturer of unreasonably dangerous product
upheld). See generally Igoe, Punitive Damages: An Analytical Perspective, 14 TRIAL,
November 1978, at 48; Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH.
L. REV. 1257 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Owen]; Rheingold, The MERt29 Story-An
Instance of Successful Mass Disaster Litigation, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 116 (1968); Robinson &
Kane, Punitive Damages in the Products Case, 15 TRIAL, January 1979, at 34; Tozer,
Punitive Damages and Product Liability, 39 INS. COUNSEL J. 300 (1972); Note, Allowance
of Punitive Damages in Products Liability Claims, 6 GA. L. REV. 613 (1972); Comment,
Punitive Damages in Products Liability Cases, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 895 (1976).
7. See, e.g., Murphy v. Hobbs, 7 Colo. 541, 5 P. 119 (1884). In Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H.
342 (1873), the court concluded that "[t]he idea [of punitive damages] is wrong. It is a
monstrous heresy... an unhealthy excrescence, deforming the symmetry of the body of
law." Id. at 382. See also Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 25 P. 1072
(1891); Bass v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 42 Wis. 654 (1877); 2 S. GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE §
253 (16th ed. 1899); C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF DAMAGES § 77 (1935); Duffy, Punitive
Damages: A Doctrine Which Should Be Abolished in THE CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE
DAMAGES 4 (Defense Research Institute Monograph 1969) [hereinafter cited as Duffy];
Ghiardi, Should Punitive Damages be Abolished?-A Statement for the Affirmative, 1965
ABA PROCEEDINGS, SECTION OF INS., NEGLIGENCE AND COMPENSATION LAW 282
[hereinafter cited as Ghiardi]; Long, Punitive Damages: An Unsettled Doctrine, 25 DRAKE
L. REV. 870, 888-89 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Long]; Willis, Measure of Damages When
Property is Wrongfully Taken by a Private Individual, 22 HARV. L. REV. 419 (1909).
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damages should be abolished.
Although the idea of a punitive remedy in a civil case has long
been a source of judicial discomfort, courts have continued to award
punitive damages. At present, all but five jurisdictions8 allow punitive
damages. One state, Indiana, has taken an intermediate position and
allows punitive damages only when a defendant's conduct is not
punishable as a crime. 9 It would be simplistic to characterize this
virtual unanimity as mere blind adherence to an outmoded principle.
Rather, the doctrine of punitive damages survives because it
continues to serve the useful purposes of expressing society's
disapproval of intolerable conduct and deterring such conduct where
no other remedy would suffice. 10
At the same time, there is no dispute that the doctrine provides
an extremely powerful remedy. In many states, punitive damages
cannot be insured against." In many others, they may be levied
against an employer for the malicious acts of an employee. 2 They
almost always are levied in excess of actual damages, 3 without the
constitutional safeguards that attend criminal prosecution. 14 For these
reasons, courts generally agree that punitive damages "are not a
favorite in law and are to be allowed only with caution and within
narrow limits.... The allowance of such damages inherently involves
an evaluation of the nature of the conduct in question, the wisdom of
8. See Ganapolsky v. Park Gardens Dev. Corp., 439 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1971) (applying
Puerto Rican law); Boutte v. Hargrove, 277 So. 2d 757 (La. App. 1973); City of Lowell v.
Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 313 Mass. 257, 269-70, 47 N.E.2d 265, 272 (1943);
Miller v. Kingsley, 194 Neb. 123, 230 N.W.2d 472 (1975); Maki v. Aluminum Bldg. Prods.,
73 Wash. 2d 23,436 P.2d 186 (1968). See note 28 infra for other states which adhere to an
intermediate position in which punitive damages are limited to compensation for actual
damages.
9. See Koerner v. Oberly, 56 Ind. 284 (1877); Taber v. Hutson, 5 Ind. 332 (1854);
Glissman v. Rutt, 372 N.E.2d 1188 (Ind. App. 1978); Nicholson v. Schramm, 164 Ind. App.
598, 330 N.E.2d 795 (1975); Moore v. Waitt, 157 Ind. App. 1, 298 N.E.2d 456 (1973). See
generally Aldridge, The Indiana Doctrine of Exemplary Damages and Double Jeopardy, 20
IND. L.J. 123 (1945).
10. See notes 58-66 & accompanying text infra.
11. See, e.g., Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962);
Brown v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 484 P.2d 1252 (Colo. App. 1971); Padavan v. Clemente,
43 A.D.2d 729, 350 N.Y.S.2d 694 (1973). See generally Haskell, Punitive Damages: The
Public Policy and the Insurance Policy, 58 ILL. B.J. 780 (1970); Long, Should Punitive
Damages Be Insured?, 44 J. OF RISK AND INS. 1 (1977).
12. See, e.g., Bingaman v. Gordon Baking Co., 186 F. Supp. 102 (N.D. Ind. 1960); W.E.
Belcher Lumber Co. v. Harrell, 252 Ala. 392, 41 So. 2d 385 (1949); Nicholson v. Schramm,
164 Ind. App. 598,330 N.E.2d 785 (1975). See generally Malicious Torts, supra note 1.
13. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 3.9, at 204.
14. See Long, supra note 7, at 885; Note, The Imposition of Punishment by Civil
Courts: A Reappraisal of Punitive Damages, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1158, 1180-81 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Punishment by Civil Courts].
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some form of pecuniary punishment, and the advisability of a
deterrent."' 5 Because of the danger of an excessive or inappropriate
imposition of punitive damages, courts must supervise punitive
damage awards closely to ensure that they are imposed only when
justified.16 Yet the standards for imposing and assessing punitive
damages remain frustratingly vague.' 7 Appellate records are replete
with evidence that judges desperately want guidance on this issue.18
The purpose of this Article is to articulate guidelines for a
principled approach to punitive damages. The Article first reviews the
policy debate over punitive damages and argues that reasons
advanced for abolishing the punitive damages doctrine altogether fail
to account for the strong policy considerations underlying the
doctrine. Next discussed are the circumstances under which
imposition of punitive damages would be appropriate. The Article
concludes by proposing both a reform in the procedures to be used in
imposing punitive damages and guidelines for assessing the amount of
damages.
Policy Debate Over Punitive Damages
Historical Development
Two major theories have been advanced to explain the
development of punitive damages in the common law system. 9 The
15. Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 429 F.2d 290, 294 (5th Cir. 1970), quoted
approvingly in Fountila v. Carter, 571 F.2d 487,491 (9th Cir. 1978); Simpson v. Weeks, 570
F.2d 240,243 (8th Cir. 1978).
16. See notes 146-63 & accompanying text infra.
17. See Long, supra note 7, at 879-83.
18. See Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962): "The
term is too loose, vague, indefinite, and uncertain; and its meaning often varies from state
to state, court to court, and jury to jury. It is a chameleon of the law-changing its hue to
the color of the situation in which it may be used." Id. at 443 (Gewin, J., concurring). In
Hibschman Pontiac, Inc. v. Batchelor, 266 Ind. 310, 362 N.E.2d 845 (1977), a concurring
judge concluded: "I doubt the efficacy of the standard enunciated by the majority for the
review of punitive damages awards, the 'first blush' rule. This rule is vague and contains
no objective standards for the evaluation of such awards in view of their purpose, the
deterrence of tortious conduct, and the danger to be guarded against, awards motivated by
vindictiveness and prejudice. I believe that we should undertake to define a standard of
review of punitive damages which imposes objective limitations upon such damages." Id. at
318, 362 N.E.2d at 849 (DeBruler, J., concurring) (emphasis added). See also Exemplary
Damages, supra note 1, at 529-30; Punitive Damages in Contract Actions, supra note 3, at
672 (lack of ascertainable standards responsible for reluctance of courts to interfere with
punitive damages awards).
19. Remarkably, the concept of multiple damages has been traced back to The Code
of Hammurabi in 2000 B.C. See Igoe, Punitive Damages: An Analytical Perspective, 14
TRIAL, November 1978, at 48, 50. See also Robinson & Kane, Punitive Damages in the
Products Case, 15 TRIAL, January 1979, at 34,36.
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first theory asserts that punitive damages grew out of the refusal of
appellate courts to grant new trials when excessive damages were
awarded at trial. 20 Because juries at early common law performed
both investigative and adjudicative functions,21 jurors were selected
for their familiarity with the litigants and with the facts in dispute.22
Because appellate courts had no established standards for measuring
compensatory damages, they deferred to the more knowledgeable
jury.23 By the end of the eighteenth century, common law courts had
developed standards to measure compensatory damages in tort,
contract, and property cases, yet remained reluctant to disturb an
excessive jury award when the defendant's conduct had been
particularly outrageous.24 To justify this reluctance, courts developed
a theory that the jury was permitted to award an amount in excess of
actual damages when the defendant's conduct had been motivated by
malice or ill will.25
A second theory asserts that punitive damages were designed to
compensate the plaintiff for otherwise uncompensable injuries.26
Because emotional harm, pain and suffering, and other intangible
harms were not compensable, punitive damages are said to have
arisen from courts' efforts to justify damage awards in excess of
actual, pecuniary injury.27 Not until courts began to recognize
intangible harm as compensable did punishment and deterrence
become the primary justifications for punitive damages.2 8
The Attack on Punitive Damages
Some critics of punitive damages argue that both theories
accounting for the development of the punitive damages doctrine
show that it was motivated by the desire to compensate the plaintiff
20. See Duffy, supra note 7, at 4-5; Ghiardi, supra note 7, at 283.
21. See Duffy, supra note 7, at 4.
22. See Punishment by Civil Courts, supra note 14, at 1159.
23. Id. at 1160.
24. See id.; Duffy, supra note 7, at 5.
25. Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. K.B. 205, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (1763). See also Duffy, supra
note 7, at 5; Punishment by Civil Courts, supra note 14, at 1160.
26. See Duffy, supra note 7, at 5.
27. See id.
28. See Exemplary Damages, supra note 1, at 520; Punishment by Civil Courts, supra
note 14, at 1161. Connecticut, Michigan, and New Hampshire apparently continue to
recongize the compensatory nature of punitive damages and limit the award to
compensation for actual suffering. LeBlanc v. Spector, 378 F. Supp. 301 (D. Conn. 1973);
Armstrong v. Dolge, 130 Conn. 516, 36 A.2d 24 (1944) (limited to expenses of litigation);
Wise v. Daniel, 221 Mich. 229, 190 N.W. 746 (1922) (compensation for injured feelings);
Bixby v. Dunlap, 56 N.H. 456 (1876); Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342 (1873) (compensation for
injured feelings).
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fully.29 Because modem tort law has developed damage formulas that
compensate the injured for intangible as well as tangible harms, these
critics contend that "the purpose for which punitive damages were
created no longer exists. The doctrine is an anachronism and should
be abolished. '30
This argument fails to account for the fact that many legal
doctrines serve purposes that differ from those for which they
originally were developed. The fourteenth amendment, for example,
originally was intended to protect newly freed slaves,31 but recently
has been used to protect large public corporations.32 So long as a
doctrine continues to serve a necessary policy goal, the fact that it has
diverged from its original function does not provide a basis for
abolishing the doctrine. The pertinent question is whether punitive
damages continue to serve a rational policy.
On more substantive grounds, critics of the doctrine contend that
it wrongfully attempts to have the civil law, without appropriate
procedural safeguards, accomplish the purpose of the criminal laws 3
Punishment, critics assert, is the purpose of the criminal system,
whereas the purpose of the civil system is to compensate the injured.34
Punitive damages provide the plaintiff with a windfall profit at the
expense of the defendant. Moreover, civil defendants may be
compelled to testify against their interests, can be punished on the
strength of a preponderance of the evidence, and also may be subject
to criminal prosecution 5
One writer argues that if the defendant's actions constitute a
criminal violation, then the defendant should be criminally
prosecuted, but "[i]f the actions of the defendant do not constitute a
crime, he then simply should not suffer punishment. ' 36 The substance
of this argument is that punishment is civilized only when it is
accompanied by the procedural safeguards built into the criminal
system and when it is imposed by someone knowledgeable and
29. Duffy, supra note 7, at 5-6; Ghiardi, supra note 7, at 286-87.
30. Duffy, supra note 7, at 8. Accord, Ghiardi, supra note 7, at 286; Long, supra note 7,
at 888. It should be noted, however, that many intangible harms remain uncompensable in
the law of contracts. See Exemplary Damages, supra note 1, at 531-33 (discussing punitive
damages in contract actions).
31. See Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 577-78 (1949) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
32. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Belloti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
33. Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45,25 P. 1072 (1891); Duffy, supra
note 7, at 9; Ghiardi, supra note 7, at 287-88; Long, supra note 7, at 885; Punishment by
Civil Courts, supra note 14, at 1161-62; Malicious Torts, supra note 1, at 1298-99.
34. Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45,25 P. 1072 (1891); Duffy, supra
note 7, at 9.
35. Ghiardi, supra note 7, at 287-88; Malicious Torts, supra note 1, at 1299.
36. Ghiardi, supra note 7, at 288.
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experienced in meting out punishment.37 Consequently, punitive
damages serve no purpose not already better served by the criminal
law.38
This argument reflects a view of the civil law which is far too
narrow. All civil doctrines are shaped with a view toward setting and
enforcing rules of behavior.39 The doctrine of punitive damages is one
of the legal devices used toward this end.40 In many cases of
aggravated misconduct in which the criminal system cannot or will
not supply society's sanction, an award of punitive damages is the
only effective deterrent .41
Another frequently stated objection to punitive damages is that
they can subject a defendant to multiple punishment.42 Because juries
now properly can grant a plaintiff relief for intangible harms,
compensatory damages arguably may contain an element of
retribution.43 Thus, a defendant may face the possibility of
punishment on three fronts: as an element of the compensatory
remedy; as punitive damages; and as a criminal sanction.
The premise that juries doubly punish a defendant through
compensatory damages and punitive damages is questionable.
Certainly, if punitive damages were not allowed, a jury likely would
incorporate the element of outrage into the compensatory award. For
example, one author cites a case that was tried three times before
three different juries, twice with a punitive damage instruction and
once without: all three verdicts were identical.44 Under these
37. See id. at 287-88. But see Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L.
REV. 1173 (1931) [hereinafter cited as Morris], where the author concludes that "[a]s long
as the liability with fault rules are retained, the law of torts will have an admonitory
function even though the doctrine of punitive damages is abandoned. So punishment in
tort actions is not anomalous (if anomalous only means unusual); and punitive damage
practice is only one of many means of varying the size of money judgments in view of the
admonitory function." Id. at 1177.
38. See Ghiardi, supra note 7, at 9-10; Punishment by Civil Courts, supra note 14, at
1161-63, 1173. In Punishment by Civil Courts, the author states that the functions of
criminal law are (1) retribution, (2) general deterrence, (3) specific deterrence, (4)
neutralization (if imprisoned), and (5) rehabilitation (if imprisoned), and that punitive
damages serve only the first three of these purposes and, even then, in a manner inferior
to criminal enforcement: "No matter how mild the criminal sanction, the possibility of
confinement or the stigma of a criminal record are greater deterrents to wrongful conduct
than the mere imposition of monetary sanctions." Id. at 1173. But see notes 101-14 &
accompanying text infra.
39. See notes 51-57 & accompanying text infra.
40. See Morris, supra note 37, at 1177.
41. See notes 66-71, 100-17 & accompanying text infra.
42. See Duffy, supra note 7, at 10; Morris, supra note 37, at 1195-98; Exemplary
Damages, supra note 1, at 524-25.
43. Exemplary Damages, supra note 1, at 524-25.
44. Id. at 521 (citing Bass v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 36 Wis. 450 (1874) ($4,500 for
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circumstances, the wiser course is to allow juries to be straightforward
and explicitly award additional damages for the outrageous nature of
a defendant's conduct. At the very least this facilitates appellate
review and conserves judicial resources by allowing remittitur or new
trials on the punitive damages issue alone.
To the extent that a punitive civil remedy might duplicate
criminal punishment, the likelihood of criminal punishment should be
taken into account when a judge decides whether to instruct a jury on
punitive damages.45 As not all outrageous conduct is criminal,
however, the argument that punitive damages would be duplicative in
some cases is not a persuasive reason for abandoning the doctrine
altogether.
Finally, those who favor abolishing the doctrine of punitive
damages argue that the lack of clear standards governing the amount
of punitive awards frees the jury to act irrationally, out of passion and
prejudice. 46 A closely related argument is that civil juries are
inexperienced and ill-equipped to mete out punishment that will be in
the best interests of society.47
Although no quantitative standards exist for measuring the
amount of punitive damages, the same can be said for measuring
intangible harm as a component of compensatory damages. As one
author contends: "The invocation of a pecuniary compensation
standard does not transform the inexact process of judicial inquiry
into high science."' 4 Punitive damages, like compensatory damages,
are subject to control by the trial court and to appellate review so that
the discretion of the jury is never unfettered. 49 Furthermore,
flexibility in the standards for punitive damages not only is necessary,
but also desirable. The effectiveness of punitive damages would be
reduced drastically if they were not individualized to fit the financial
status of the defendant and the reprehensibility of his or her
conduct.50
Although the foregoing objections to the doctrine of punitive
exemplary and compensatory damages combined); 39 Wis. 636 (1876) ($4,500
compensatory); 42 Wis. 654,671-72 (1877) ($2,500 compensatory, $2,000 exemplary)).
45. See notes 115-18, 180-82 & accompanying text infra.
46. See Duffy, supra note 7, at 10; Ghiardi, supra note 7, at 287; Long, supra note 7, at
885; Morris, supra note 37, at 1189; Morris, Punitive Damages in Personal Injury Cases, 21
OHIO ST. L.J. 216,227 (1960); Malicious Torts, supra note 1, at 1298.
47. See Morris, supra note 37, at 1179.
48. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 219 (discussing the multiple purposes of compensatory
damages in contract cases). See also Exemplary Damages, supra note 1, at 529-30.
49. See, e.g., Butts v. Curtis Publishing Co., 225 F. Supp. 916, 919 (N.D. Ga. 1964),
affd, 351 F.2d 702 (1965), affd, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Cox v. Stolworthy, 94 Idaho 683, 496
P.2d 682 (1972). See also DOBBS, supra note 1, at 220; Punishment by Civil Courts, supra
note 14, at 1171-72.
50. See notes 175, 178 & accompanying text infra.
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damages command attention and respect, they do not dictate the
abolition of the doctrine. Rather, they merely present negative
features that must be balanced against the doctrine's positive goals.
Justifications for Imposing Punitive Damages
Stated in broad terms, the function performed by the doctrine of
punitive damages is to aid courts in enforcing established norms of
conduct.1 All law, whether civil or criminal, reflects society's norms
and goals. The criminal system enforces these rules to some extent by
punishing those who violate criminal statutes, thereby deterring the
defendant-and others-from similar conduct.52 The criminal system
does not, however, have a monopoly on this task.
Whenever a civil court resolves the conflicting claims of two
private parties, it also sets and enforces standards of behavior.5 3 For
this reason, in addition to achieving a result that does justice between
the parties, a court also must achieve a result that protects the interest
of society. That the civil law operates to prod behavior toward certain
goals is demonstrated by the fact that liability for both torts54 and
contracts is premised upon failure to conform to expected standards
of behavior. Professor Morris states that "while our joint interest in
the economic stability of the individuals who make up society supplies
a sufficient reason for giving money to plaintiffs, it suggests no reason
for taking money from defendants.55 In his apt terms, civil law has
both "reparative" and "admonitory" functions.5 6 The doctrine of
punitive damages concerns itself with the latter function;57 it enhances
the civil law's admonition to wrongdoers in several important ways.
Expressing Society's Disapproval of Outrageous Conduct and Deterring Such
Conduct in the Future
An award of compensatory damages may be sufficient when
injury has resulted from well-intentioned, but poorly-advised
51. See Lampert v. Reynolds Metals Co., 372 F.2d 245, 247 (9th Cir. 1967); Brown v.
Coates, 253 F.2d 36, 40 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Acheson v. Shefter, 107 Ariz. 576, 578, 490 P.2d
832, 834 (1971); Eshelman v. Rawalt, 298 Ill. 192, 197, 131 N.E. 675, 677 (1921). See also
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 4, at 14-16 (4th ed. 1971).
52. See Punishment by Civil Courts, supra note 14, at 1161-62.
53. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 4, at 18 (4th ed. 1971).
54. See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 217; Punishment by Civil Courts, supra note 1, at 523.
55. Morris, supra note 37, at 1173 (emphasis in original).
56. Id. at 1173-76. Professor Morris uses the term "reparative" to mean providing
money substitutes for losses. Id. at 1173. "Admonitory" refers to discouraging repetition
of wrongful conduct and warning others who are inclined to engage in similar conduct. Id
at 1174.
57. Id. at 1176.
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behavior.58 When the defendant's conduct can be characterized as
malicious, oppressive, or otherwise outrageous, a stronger sanction is
needed. The imposition of punitive damages effectively expresses to
the defendant that such conduct will not be tolerated.
This expression of disapproval by extracting money from the
defendant for his or her misconduct may fairly be characterized as
punishment.59 If the doctrine of punitive damages were based solely
on vindictiveness, however, it surely would be unsupportable.
Although vindictiveness is a common human emotion, vindictive
behavior is particularly irrational in that it seeks to inflict present
suffering to "remedy" past injuries that cannot be undone. Inflicting
punishment for past acts, however, tends also to control future
behavior, in that the defendant and others in a similar position will
wish to avoid the unpleasant consequences of such acts in the future.6°
Punishment, therefore, cannot be separated from deterrence.
This deterrent effect aids a civil court in enforcing social norms,61
and consequently is especially vital where the defendant would have
little else to lose by committing the wrong. Two cases demonstrate
this point. In Harris v. Wagshal,62 the defendants perpetrated
numerous frauds on their judgment creditor to hinder the creditor's
attempts to satisfy a judgment. Absent the imposition of punitive
damages, the defendants had little to lose by their acts; the
compensatory relief available would only have forced them to
58. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Executive Estates, Inc., 369 N.E.2d
1117, 1130-31 (Ind. App. 1978) (an award of punitive damages for mere negligence is
improper; conduct supporting such an award must be of a more reprehensible character).
59. For discussion of the punitive element, see Long, supra note 7, at 876-77;
Exemplary Damages, supra note 1, at 523-24; Punishment by Civil Courts, supra note 14, at
1161-63.
60. See Zarcone v. Perry, 572 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1978); Lampert v. Reynolds Metals Co.,
372 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1967); Morgan v. Bates, 390 P.2d 486 (Okla. 1964). See also Sostre v.
McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 205 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub nom. Sostre v. Oswald, 404
U.S. 1049 (1972); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 23 (4th ed. 1971);
Morris, supra note 37, at 1181; Malicious Torts, supra note 1, at 1298.
61. See, e.g., Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 429 F.2d 290, 294 (5th Cir. 1970);
Jones v. Abriani, 350 N.E.2d 635, 650 (Ind. App. 1976); McCarthy v. J.P. Cullen & Son
Corp., 199 N.W.2d 362, 368 (Iowa 1972). See also Riley, Punitive Damages: The Doctrine
of Just Enrichment, 27 DRAKE L. REV. 195,203 (1977-78) [hereinafter cited as Riley]. But
see Duffy, supra note 7, at 11; Ghiardi, supra note 7, at 288. Both Duffy and Ghiardi
contend that the deterrent function of punitive damages is fictional, because the incidence
of outrageous conduct is no higher in the states that disallow punitive damages than in the
states that allow them. This conclusion is unfounded, as the figures do not show what the
incidence of outrageous conduct would have been in the 46 states that allow punitive
damages but for the doctrine. Melvin Belli states that "[a]sking whether punitive damages
actually do deter misconduct is like asking whether the death penalty deters murder."
Belli, Punitive Damages: An Historical Perspective, 13 TRIAL, December 1977, at 40,44.
62. 343 A.2d 283 (D.C. App. 1975).
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relinquish the property to the rightful owners. The imposition of
punitive damages, however, removed the incentive for committing
fraud. 63 This rationale also applies in cases in which the defendant has
determined that he or she will reap greater profits by engaging in
wrongful conduct and running the risk of later paying compensation
for such conduct. For example, in Funk v. Kerbaugh,64 the defendant
decided that it would be "cheaper to pay damages"65 for carrying out
blasting in a manner which destroyed the plaintiffs building than to
alter the blasting method. When the possibility of a punitive damage
award of an uncertain amount enters a defendant's decisionmaking
process, the financial temptation to engage in wrongful conduct
becomes more resistable.66
Providing Incentives for Private Civil Enforcement
All serious misdeeds cannot possibly be punished by government
prosecution. For one thing, not all misconduct is punishable as a
crime or a civil violation; for another, limited judicial and
prosecutorial resources permit prosecution for only a fraction of the
crimes and violations committed. For these reasons, individual
members of society must play a significant role in instituting actions
to impose sanctions for serious misconduct. Society's interest in
bringing a wrongdoer to justice is especially strong where the
wrongdoer's conduct exceeds all bounds of decency.
The doctrine of punitive damages promotes this interest.67 By
offering the potential for recovery in excess of actual damages, the
doctrine encourages plaintiffs to bring such actions.68 This is
particularly important where actual damages are minimal.69 Absent
the possibility of obtaining punitive damages, it would be
economically unfeasible in such cases for a plaintiff to bring a lawsuit
63. Id. at 288 n.13. Although the creditor claimed no compensatory damages resulting
from the fraud, the court found the award of punitive damages nonetheless proper, stating:
"Since the purpose of punitive damages is to punish and deter intolerable conduct, we do
not find it inappropriate to assess damages in a case such as this in proportion to the sum
hoped to be gained by the fraud." Id.
64. 222 Pa. 18, 70 A. 953 (1908).
65. Id. at 19, 70 A. at 954.
66. See Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809,598 P.2d 452, 157 Cal. Rptr.
482 (1979) (punitive damages operate as attempt to restore balance in contractual
relationships); Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 21 Cal. 3d 910, 923, 582 P.2d 980, 987, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 389, 396 (1978) (refusal to accept settlement offer motivated by desire to use family's
unfortunate circumstances as lever to force settlement more favorable to company).
67. DOBBS, supra note 1, at 205.
68. See Kink v. Combs, 28 Wis. 2d 65, 80, 135 N.W.2d 789, 798 (1965); DOBBS, supra
note 1, at 205; Long, supra note 7, at 878; Morris, supra note 37, at 1183-88.
69. DOBBS, supra note 1, at 205; Long, supra note 7, at 878; Exemplary Damages,
supra note 1, at 525-26.
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and unlikely that the defendant would be deterred from similar action
in the future. Punitive damages thus can be characterized as a reward
for the plaintiff's valuable role as a "private attorney general. '70 Even
here compensatory damages are substantial, an award of punitive
damages helps to finance deserving claims by defraying the expenses
of the action, such as attorneys' fees, that generally are not
recoverable in American courts.71 Finally, by ensuring that a plaintiff
can pursue a private punitive remedy, with the potential for financial
gain at the expense of the wrongdoer, the doctrine of punitive
damages encourages plaintiffs to prefer legal action over violent
self-help. 72 Although revenge is not a civilized basis for imposing
punitive damages, the prevention of private vengeance clearly is.73
Although the policy debate over the doctrine of punitive
damages demonstrates that the doctrine is potentially dangerous and
unfair when applied without regard to its underlying principles, the
doctrine is an undeniably powerful tool in controlling antisocial
conduct. The question then becomes, when is such a powerful remedy
appropriate?
What Conduct Should Give Rise to Punitive Damages?
One author has noted that punitive damages have been imposed
as a result of "an astounding range of conduct from 'oppression,
fraud, or malice' on the one extreme to 'rudeness' or 'mere caprice'
on the other."74 To some extent, providing considerable judicial
discretion is unavoidable-even desirable-when one considers that a
court's decision to impose punitive damages reflects a value judgment
about whether a defendant's misconduct has been serious enough to
warrant an extra measure of deterrence. Nevertheless, merely to state
that punitive damages will be imposed in cases involving malice,
oppression, and the like may obscure the principles underlying the
doctrine rather than enforce them. More specific guidance is
necessary to promote principled imposition of punitive damages. One
major factor is whether any other existing remedy performs the
functions for which the doctrine was designed. This, in turn, depends
on the conduct involved.
70. For discussion of the enforcement aspect of a plaintiffs role, see Walker v.
Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 404, 179 N.E.2d 497, 498, 223 N.Y.S.2d 488, 490 (1961); DOBBS,
supra note 1, at 205; Morris, supra note 37, at 1183-88; Exemplary Damages, supra note 1,
at 525-26.
71. See Exemplary Damages, supra note 1, at 521.
72. Id. at 521-22; Morris, supra note 37, at 1198-99.
73. See Exemplary Damages, supra note 1, at 521-22.
74. Long, supra note 7, at 881.
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Tortious Conduct
Although tort law has been the traditional arena for punitive
damage awards, not every tort gives rise to punitive damages.75
Simple negligence, for example, is not a sufficient basis for imposing
punitive damages.76 Courts rightfully have regarded the availability of
compensatory damages as a sufficient deterrent to negligence, if
indeed negligence can be deterred at all.77 More to the point,
however, is the notion that negligent conduct is not culpable enough
to justify the stern sanction of civil punishment.78 The simple fact that
negligent acts are committed regularly is significant; an extraordinary
sanction should not be imposed on ordinary conduct. Rather, the
sanction of punitive damages is, and should be, reserved for conduct
that exceeds the bounds of normal fumbling. The defendant's state of
mind is what transforms conduct from the understandable to the
intolerable.79 When the defendant actively has desired to bring about
harm to another, or when he or she has callously threatened harm to
the rights of others, that conduct is not merely unreasonable, it is
abhorrent.
The closer a defendant's state of mind comes to a subjective
perception of the risk of harm to another, the more likely it becomes
that punitive damages will be awarded.80 Accordingly, simple
negligence is not subject to punitive damages, but conduct variously
termed "gross negligence," "willful and wanton misconduct," or
"reckless disregard for the safety of others" frequently is.81 Although
there has been some disagreement over the meaning of these terms,8
to the extent that they indicate that the defendant had or should have
had a subjective perception of the risks involved, punitive damages
75. See Riley, supra note 61, at 225 (commission of tort in malicious manner
traditional basis for punitive damage assessment).
76. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Executive Estates, Inc., 369 N.E.2d
1117, 1130-31 (Ind. App. 1978).
77. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 10 (4th ed. 1971);
Punishment by Civil Courts, supra note 14, at 1164-65.
78. See Punishment by Civil Courts, supra note 14, at 1165.
79. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 11 (4th ed. 1971):
"[I]t is not so much the particular tort committed as the defendant's motives and conduct
in committing it which will be important as the basis of the award."
80. See DOBBS, supra note 1, at 205-06.
81. See, e.g., Brooks v. Wootton, 355 F.2d 177, 178 (2d Cir. 1966); Alabama Elec.
Coop., Inc. v. Partridge, 283 Ala. 251,215 So. 2d 580 (1968); Soucy v. Greyhound Corp., 27
App. Div. 2d 112, 276 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1967); Sunray DX Oil Co. v. Brown, 477 P.2d 67,
70-71 (Okla. 1970); Jones v. Hernandez, 148 Ind. App. 17,263 N.E.2d 759 (1970). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 501, Comment (b) (1965).
82. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 10 (4th ed. 1971);
Punishment by Civil Courts, supra note 14, at 1164-65.
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are properly awarded. 83 An example of this type of conduct is
supplied by Claunch v. Bennett,84 in which the defendant engaged a
friend in a drag race on a busy city street, at speeds upwards of ninety
miles per hour. A collision ensued, resulting in the plaintiff's injuries.
Although there was no showing that the defendant driver consciously
had desired to cause harm to others, the risk he was creating was so
great and so obvious that proceeding in the face of it could only be
characterized as callous indifference. Accordingly, to warrant
punitive damages conduct must be reckless, not merely derelict.
In many cases, a defendant's attitude of callousness toward
potential harm constitutes a greater threat to society, and hence
increases the need for deterrence, than the isolated occurrence of the
speed contest in Claunch; for instance, where the defendant proceeds
in the face of a known risk to a large number of people. For example,
in Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc.,85 a leading manufacturer of
pharmaceuticals marketed a drug known as MER/29, which
purported to aid treatment of arteriosclerosis by inhibiting the
production of cholesterol in blood. Although the company's own
experiments showed abnormal blood changes and eye opacities in
animals, the defendant repeatedly covered up reports of these
experiments, fictionalized data, and misrepresented facts to both the
medical profession and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
When MER/29 was approved by the FDA, its release was
accompanied by the greatest marketing push ever conducted by the
company. Despite the fact that harmful side effects in humans were
soon reported, the company continued to deny that the drug was
dangerous and bitterly fought the FDA's recall of the drug. The tragic
result of the defendant's callousness was that over 5,000 people were
injured, among them the plaintiff, who suffered cataracts in both eyes.
The California Court of Appeal affirmed the $250,00086 punitive
damages award, stating that there was ample evidence in the record
that the defendant had acted recklessly and in wanton disregard of
possible harm to others by marketing and promoting MER/29 despite
knowledge of the drug's toxic side effects. 87
83. See Punishment by Civil Courts, supra note 14, at 1165.
84. 395 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. App. 1965).
85. 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967). See generally Rheingold, The
MER/29 Story-An Instance of Successful Mass Disaster Litigation, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 116
(1968).
86. The original jury award of $500,000 punitive damages subsequently was reduced
by consent to $250,000. Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 694, 60
Cal. Rptr. 398,403 (1967).
87. Id. at 713-15, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 415-16. But see Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,
378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967), another MER/29 case in which the plaintiff's injuries arose out
of the same course of conduct. The court in Roginsky concluded that there was insufficient
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Although the punitive damages awarded in Toole were paltry in
comparison to the $7,000,000 the company grossed from the sale of
MER/29 during its first year of sales,88 the award of any punitive
damages acted as a warning to the defendant and others who might
be tempted to engage in similar conduct. That warning stated that
society will not tolerate calculated misconduct that risks human
suffering. Imposing damages in excess of actual harm greatly
increases the costs and uncertainty surrounding reckless misbehavior
and makes wrongful conduct less tempting.89
Courts frequently cite oppression as being a ground for the
imposition of punitive damages.90 Oppression carries with it an
attitudinal element, for it implies knowledge of power over a weaker
party and use of that power as leverage to gain one's own ends. A
recent example of this type of case is Zarcone v. Perry,91 in which
punitive damages were awarded against a judge. The plaintiff in
Zarcone operated a food vending truck in front of a courthouse.
During a night court session, the defendant judge asked a deputy to
bring some coffee to the courtroom. The judge tasted the coffee,
found it to be "putrid," and ordered the deputy to bring the vendor
before him "in cuffs." 92 The deputy then manacled the vendor and
marched him to the judge's chambers in view of dozens of people.
The judge conducted a pseudo-official inquisition in which he loudly
berated the vendor for 20 minutes, threatening him and his livelihood.
The vendor then was allowed to leave, but upon returning to the
courthouse area after resuming his normal route he was again called
proof of managerial complicity to justify punitive damages and that, in view of the
multiple litigation, the imposition of punitive damages could punish the defendants too
severely and "strip the cupboard bare" for other plaintiffs. See notes 183-92 &
accompanying text infra. For a discussion of the punitive damages issue in the MER/29
cases see Rheingold, The MER/29 Story-An Instance of Mass Disaster Litigation, 56
CALIF. L. REV. 116,134-37 (1968).
88. Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 701, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398,408
(1967).
89. The jury in a California product liability case involving the Ford Pinto based its
punitive damage award of $125 million on a disgorgement of profits theory. The jury
allegedly felt that since Ford had saved $100 million by marketing the unsafe fuel tanks,
only an amount in excess of that figure would property penalize the defendant. See The
Wall Street Journal, Feb. 14, 1978, at 1, col. 4. The trial judge subsequently reduced the
punitive damages award to $3.5 million, holding the jury award excessive as a matter of
law. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., No. 197761-199397 (Cal. Super. Ct., Orange County
Feb. 14, 1978), reported in 22 JURY VERDICrS WEEKLY, No. 14, at 26 (1978). The case
presently is on appeal to the California Court of Appeal. Id. See note 176 &
accompanying text infra.
90. See, e.g., Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58 (1897); Roberts v. Pierce, 398 F.2d 954 (5th
Cir. 1968); Morgan v. Bates, 390 P.2d 486 (Okla. 1964).
91. 572 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1978).
92. Id at 53.
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to the judge's chambers and verbally abused. The vendor brought
suit, alleging he had suffered emotional distress from this incident
which required hospitalization and prevented him from working.
Although the vendor was awarded $80,000 in compensatory damages,
the defendant's contention on appeal that the size of the
compensatory award precluded a punitive damages award was
rebuffed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals:
[T]here is no merit to appellant's converse claim that a large
compensatory award in a civil rights action precludes a substantial
punitive award. The purpose of the former is to make a plaintiff
whole for his injuries; the main purpose of the latter is to deter
defendants and others from similar conduct in the future. 9
3
The conduct of the judge in Zarcone is shocking for the very reason
that the judge, knowing he possessed the power of the state, used that
power for personal vindictiveness. The imposition of punitive
damages can be invaluable in cases of oppression, whether the
oppression be governmental or economic. Because of the disparity of
power between the parties, the stronger party has little else to fear.94
Accordingly, in instances of tortious conduct punitive damages
are properly imposed when the defendant's misconduct exceeds the
bounds of behavior with which most people can identify. Whether the
misconduct is termed malicious, reckless, fraudulent, or oppressive,
the defendant must or should have had a perception of the possibility
of harm to others. This would include cases in which the defendant
may deny the conscious wish to do harm, but in which the risk of
harm created is so obvious that simply continuing in the face of that
risk can be characterized as callousness. 95 Such conduct implies a
flouting of social norms, not just an accidental violation, and calls for
a sanction more severe than mere compensatory damages. Moreover,
when the misconduct is not a violation of criminal statutes, the
imposition of punishment by a civil court is likely to be the only
effective way of admonishing the defendant.
93. Id. at 55 n.6.
94. It should be noted that the defendant in Zarcone was removed from the bench for
his treatment of the plaintiff. Id. at 54. The court stated that the judge's removal did not
militate against the imposition of punitive damages, since "punitive damages are meant to
deter others as well as the particular defendant." Id. at 56. Thus, the court treated the
judge's removal as special deterrence only. It seems likely, however, that the potential for
removal is as effective, if not more effective, than punitive damages as a warning to future
judges. For that reason, while the facts of the Zarcone case are squarely within the type of
conduct for which punitive damages should be imposed, the decision arguably is
unprincipled because of the presence of another effective deterrent. The only saving
argument is that the punitive damages award in Zarcone serves as a lesson to nonjudicial
oppressors, who may not be subject to removal from office.
95. See, e.g., Jones v. Hernandez, 148 Ind. App. 17,263 N.E.2d 759 (1970).
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Conduct Punishable as a Crime
The policy attack on punitive damages is most persuasive when
the conduct for which punitive damages are imposed is also
punishable as a crime. If a defendant has violated a criminal statute,
he or she stands to lose liberty or property in addition to suffering the
stigma of criminal conviction. The argument against the imposition of
punitive damages in such cases is that society's interest in punishing
the wrongdoer is served adequately by the criminal system, and the
imposition of punitive damages would work an unjustifiable double
punishment.96 Although the argument does not support the general
abandonment of punitive damages, nor even the abandonment of the
doctrine in all cases involving criminal conduct, it does have merit in
those cases in which the criminal system is adequately performing the
functions of punishment and deterrence.
One state, Indiana, has adopted the rule that punitive damages
will not lie in a civil case based on conduct that is punishable as a
crime.97 Although the rule apparently grew out of the erroneous view
that the imposition of punitive damages would violate the
constitutional ban on double jeopardy,98 it is now based on the spirit
of the law regarding multiple punishment for the same offense. 99 The
position of the Indiana courts is attractive because it purports to use
punitive damages only when no other effective deterrent exists. To
the extent that such a rule would disallow punitive damages when the
conduct is merely punishable as a crime,1°° however, it falls short of a
96. See Punishment by Civil Courts, supra note 14, at 1177-84.
97. See Koerner v. Oberly, 56 Ind. 284 (1877); Taber v. Hutson, 5 Ind. 322 (1854);
Glissman v. Rutt, 372 N.E.2d 1188 (Ind. App. 1978); Nicholson v. Schramm, 164 Ind. App.
598, 330 N.E.2d 785 (1975); Moore v. Waitt, 157 Ind. App. 1, 298 N.E.2d 456 (1973). See
also Aldridge, The Indiana Doctrine of Exemplary Damages and Double Jeopardy, 20 IND.
L.J. 123 (1945); Punitive Damages in Contract Actions, supra note 3, at 673-77. Many states
have explicitly approved the imposition of punitive damages where the defendant also
may be punished criminally. See, e.g., Guengerich v. Smith, 36 Iowa 587 (1873); Colbert v.
Journal Publishing Co., 19 N.M. 156, 142 P. 146 (1914). Three states hold that evidence of
a prior criminal conviction and penalty is appropriately received as evidence bearing on
mitigation of punitive damages. See Saunders v. Gilbert, 156 N.C. 463, 72 S.E. 610 (1911);
Wirsing v. Smith, 222 Pa. 8, 70 A, 906 (1908); Jackson v. Wells, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 275, 35
S.W. 528 (1896).
98. Koerner v. Oberly, 56 Ind. 284 (1877) (explicitly so stating). The rule, however,
clearly is not mandated by the United States Constitution. Rex Trailer Co. v. United
States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938); Herald Co. v.
Harper, 293 F. Supp. 1101 (E. D. Mo. 1968), affid, 410 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1969); Hauser v.
Griffith, 102 Iowa 215, 71 N.W. 223 (1897). Cf. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. 378
F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967) (dealing with problem of imposing punitive damages when
multiple suits may be brought).
99. See State v. Schoonover, 135 Ind. 526, 35 N.E. 119 (1893); Taber v. Hutson, 5 Ind.
322 (1854).
100. The rule in Indiana appears to apply whenever the defendant might be prosecuted.
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principled approach. Many types of conduct are technical violations
of the criminal law, but in fact rarely are prosecuted. 10' Examples of
this include libel and slander, trespass, and technical batteries.'t 2 In
such cases, punitive damages act as a substitute for the criminal
system rather than a duplication. 0 3
Many other crimes, notably those involving unlawful commercial
behavior, depend on the threat of civil punishment for effective
enforcement despite substantial government prosecution. The raft of
state'0 4 and federal statutes'0 5 that provide for multiple civil damages
in addition to criminal penalties bears witness to this fact. The treble
damage provision of the federal antitrust laws,106 for example, can be
considered a thinly-veiled type of punitive damages0 7 In view of the
limited resources of the Department of Justice, treble damages are a
more effective deterrent than the possibility of criminal
prosecution.108
It would be naive to suppose-even where conduct is of a type
that is frequently prosecuted-that the criminal system will always
Koerner v. Oberly, 56 Ind. 284 (1877); Taber v. Hutson, 5 Ind. 322 (1854); Nicholson v.
Schramm, 164 Ind. App. 598,330 N.E.2d 785 (1975); Moore v. Waitt, 157 Ind. App. 1, 298
N.E.2d 456 (1973). The possibility that the rule prohibits punitive damages only where the
defendant has been convicted of a crime was raised in Glissman v. Rutt, 372 N.E.2d 1188
(Ind. App. 1978), but not definitely answered as the court concluded that the facts of the
case made it unnecessary to determine whether the mere possibility of criminal
prosecution is sufficient to bar the award of punitive damages. Id. at 1191 n.2.
101. See Punishment by Civil Courts, supra note 14, at 1175-76.
102. Id. at 1175.
103. See id. at 1175-76.
104. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 24-1-2-7 (1976) (persons injured by combinations to restrain
trade or prevent competition may recover treble damages).
105. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976) (treble damages for private person injured by
violation of antitrust laws); 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1976) (treble damages for private person
injured by unfair competition in importing trade); 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1976) (authorizes
punitive damages in an unlimited amount for person injured by wire interception); 29
U.S.C. § 216(b) (Supp. 1 1977) (discretionary award of up to two times actual damages for
violation of minimum wage and overtime pay provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act); 42
U.S.C. § 3612(b), (c) (1976) (authorizes up to $1,000 punitive damages for private person
enforcing fair housing laws).
106. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976) provides that: "[a]ny person who shall be injured in his
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue
therefor... and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee."
107. Acme Precision Prods., Inc. v. American Alloys Corp., 347 F. Supp. 376,380 (W.D.
Mo. 1972), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 422 F.2d 1395 (8th Cir. 1970) (dictum).
108. See generally Loevinger, Private Action-The Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, 3
ANTITRUST BULL. 167 (1958). But cf. Breit & Elzinga, Antitrust Enforcement and
Economic Efficiency: The Uneasy Case for Treble Damages, 17 J.L. & ECON. 329 (1974)
(suggesting that a public sector approach to enforcement would be a preferable alternative
to private enforcement).
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fulfill its function. 10 9 Practices such as plea bargaining, suspending
sentences, and granting pardons, immunity, and parole, water down
the deterrent effect of the criminal law. Furthermore, maximum
criminal penalties, to ensure due process, must be established in
advance by the legislature. Punitive damages, on the other hand, can
be individualized to provide a deterrent that will be adequate for each
case.110
Although in a criminal case a trial judge may be flexible in
sentencing, in some situations the maximum applicable penalty is
small in relation to the reprehensibility of the conduct and the
defendant's ability to pay. This is often true where the defendant is a
corporation, not subject to loss of liberty."' For example, Ford Motor
Company recently was indicted in Indiana on three counts of reckless
homicide stemming from its defective design of fuel tanks on the
Pinto, which allegedly caused the death of three young girls." 2 If
convicted on all three counts, Ford could lose $35,000 in fines." 3 In a
recent civil suit in California brought against Ford by a young man
who was injured under similar circumstances, the punitive damages
award, even as reduced by the judge, totalled $3.5 million." 4 Can
there be any doubt as to which penalty will be the more effective
deterrent?
Because the criminal system cannot always adequately fulfill its
role as an enforcer of society's rules, punitive damages should not be
eliminated on the ground that the defendant's conduct may be
punished as a crime. By the same token, punitive damages should not
be imposed in instances in which the criminal system is fulfilling its
function. If the criminal system does provide adequate punishment
and deterrence, the imposition of punitive damages would be
duplicative and thus unprincipled."5 Punitive damages should be used
in civil cases involving criminal misconduct only when they are
109. See Morris, supra note 37, at 1196: "It is a notoriously good guess that current
administration of the criminal law is not particularly efficient."
110. See id.
111. For example, Richardson-Merrell, Inc., Win, S. Merrell Co., and three of its
scientists were indicted under the federal false writing statute (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001 (1976)) for their activities with regard to MER/29. All defendants pleaded nolo
contendere. "The corporate defendants were fined a total of $80,000, the maximum
penalty, and the three scientists received suspended sentences." Rheingold, The MER/29
Story-An Instance of Successful Mass Disaster Litigation, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 116, 120-21
(1968).
112. Louisville Courier-Journal, Sept. 15,1978, § b, at 3, col. 1.
113. Id.
114. The jury originally had awarded $125 million in punitive damages. The judge
reduced this award to $3.5 million, holding the larger figure excessive as a matter of law.
See note 89 supra.
115. See Punishment by Civil Courts, supra note 14, at 1181- 84.
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needed as a substitute for, or as a supplement to, criminal sanctions.
What is needed in such cases is not a wholesale ban on punitive
damages, but rather a system of getting more information to the trial
judge.116 The judge should have access to information concerning
criminal prosecutions of the defendant to make an informed decision
about the propriety of a punitive damages instruction.117 If
prosecution has been instituted for an offense that carries a serious
penalty, the judge properly could decline the instruction.118 If,
however, criminal prosecution has not been instituted against the
defendant, or if prosecution has been instituted but the maximum
penalty is unduly slight in relation to the seriousness of the
defendant's conduct and ability to pay, punitive damages may be
appropriate.
Oppressive Conduct in Contractual Relationships
Although courts frequently state that punitive damages are not
recoverable in contract actions,119 this rule always has had important
exceptions. 20 Punitive damages long have been imposed in contract
cases that have a decidedly tortious flavor, such as those involving
breach of contract to marry, breach of contract by public utility
companies, and breach of fiduciary duty.121 In addition, one of the
most important exceptions to the rule is that punitive damages may
be imposed if the breach of contract constitutes some independent
tort.122 Recent cases in the insurance area demonstrate that this
exception threatens to swallow the rule, because of the willingness of
courts to recognize bad faith breach of contract as a new tort in itself.
116. Id. at 1175.
117. See notes 180-182 & accompanying text infra.
118. See Punishment by Civil Courts, supra note 14, at 1174, 1181-82 (suggesting that
where such prosecution is likely, punitive damages would be inappropriate). However,
basing the imposition of punitive damages on the likelihood of criminal prosecution would
be unworkable. There are bound to be cases where prosecution seemed likely at the time
of the civil trial but never was instituted. In cases such as these that involve serious
misconduct no deterrent at all would be available. In cases where a defendant is not
prosecuted until after the civil trial, the criminal trial judge should be able to take the
punitive damages award into consideration in a sentencing decision. See Morris, supra
note 37, at 1197.
119. See, e.g., Young v. Main, 72 F.2d 640, 643 (8th Cir. 1934); Hibschman Pontiac, Inc.
v. Batchelor, 266 Ind. App. 310, 314, 340 N.E.2d 377, 379 (1976); Ford Motor Co. v.
Mayes, 575 SW.2d 480, 486 (Ky. App. 1978); White v. Benkowski, 37 Wis. 2d 285, 290-92,
155 NW.2d 74,77 (1967).
120. See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 220-40.
121. See id. at 220-29; Punitive Damages in Contract Actions, supra note 3, at 677-78.
122. See, e.g., Country Club Corp. v. McDaniel, 310 So. 2d 436, 437 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975); Hibschman Pontiac, Inc. v. Batchelor, 266 Ind. App. 310, 314, 340 N.E.2d 377, 380
(1976); Ford Motor Co. v. Mayes, 575 S.W.2d 480,486 (Ky. App. 1978) (dictum).
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The famous California case of Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance
Co. 23 established that a duty of good faith is implied in every
insurance contract and that the breach of that duty sounds in both
tort and contract. 2 4 Under more recent California law, an insurer
who erroneously denies coverage under a policy will be liable for
compensatory damages, including damages for emotional distress,
even where its denial was not entirely groundless.125 More is required,
however, to subject the insurer to punitive damages. 26 A recent case
illustrates what that "something extra" is that merits civil punishment.
In Neal v. Farmers Insurance Exchange'2 7 an insured motorist
was seriously injured in an automobile collision with an uninsured
motorist. The injured party's insurance coverage provided uninsured
motorist benefits and a medical payment provision. Although the
defendant insurance company paid the benefits due under the
medical payment provision, it asserted various defenses to the
requirement that it pay uninsured motorist benefits. Arbitration
proceedings were instituted and defendant was found liable for the
benefits. The injured motorist then instituted a court action'2 8 seeking
compensatory and punitive damages for bad faith failure to pay the
benefits prior to arbitration. The award of compensatory and punitive
damages totaling $749,011.48129 was affirmed by the California
Supreme Court.
In addressing the issue of punitive damages, the court, although
noting that breach of the duty of good faith had been shown,
concluded "such a determination does not in itself establish that
defendant acted with the quality of intent that is requisite to an award
of punitive damages. For this we must look further-beyond the
matter of reasonable response to that of motive and intent."'130 The
court concluded that this extra showing was met by evidence that
defendant "acted maliciously, with an intent to oppress, and in
123. 9 Cal. 3d 566,5 10 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
124. Id. at 573, 510 P.2d at 1036-37, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 484-85. A substantial amount of
California case law supported this decision. See Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425,
426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967); Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d
654,328 P.2d 198 (1958).
125. See Johansen v. California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau, 15 Cal. 3d 9, 15,
538 P.2d 744,748, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288,292 (1975).
126. See Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452,521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr.
711 (1974).
127. 21 Cal. 3d 910, 582 P.2d 980,148 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1978).
128. Subsequent to the filing of the complaint the plaintiff motorist died of other causes
and was succeeded by her administrator. Id. at 917, 582 P.2d at 983,148 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
129. The jury originally had awarded $1,528,211.35, but this amount was reduced by
plaintiff's remittitur in response to a conditional order granting defendant's motion for a
new trial. Id. at 920, 582 P.2d at 985, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
130. Id. at 922, 582 P.2d at 986, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
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conscious disregard of the rights of its insured.' 131 The court
considered the defendant's conduct to be "part of a conscious course
of conduct, designed to utilize the lamentable circumstances in
which... [the insured and her family] found themselves, and the
exigent financial situation resulting from it, as a lever to force a
settlement more favorable to the company than the facts would
otherwise have warranted."'132 This conduct was the "something
extra" on which the court hinged the award of punitive damages.1 33
The California cases allowing punitive damages against insurance
companies have done so by classifying the bad faith breach of
contract as a tort. 34 This approach has been necessitated by a
California statute that allows punitive damages only for "the breach
of an obligation not arising from contract.'1 35 Other states,
unhampered by such a statute, appear to be breaking with the
traditional rule of disallowing punitive damages in contract cases and
have imposed punitive damages in cases involving malicious,
oppressive, or like conduct, despite the existence of a contract.136
Significantly, this trend is not limited to cases involving insurance
companies.
Jones v. Abriani 37 exemplifies this more modern approach of
other states. In Jones, the plaintiffs were a young married couple who
had ordered a new mobile home from the defendants. When the
mobile home arrived, the plaintiffs found that it differed from the
home they had ordered and was defective in several important
respects. They immediately attempted to reject the delivery but were
threatened with forfeiture of their down payment by the sellers, who
assured the plaintiffs that the defects would be cured. The sellers also
131. Id. at 923, 582 P.2d at 986-87, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
132. Id. at 923, 582 P.2d at 987, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
133. Accord, Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 822, 598 P.2d 452, 157
Cal. Rptr. 482 (1979) (citing Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 21 Cal. 3d 910, 582 P.2d 980, 148
Cal. Rptr. 389 (1978)) (concluding evidence supported finding that defendant "'acted
maliciously, with an intent to oppress, and in conscious disregard of the rights of its
insured' but finding punitive damages award of $5 million excessive as a matter of law).
134. See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 241; Punitive Damages in Contract Actions, supra
note 3, at 680.
135. CAL. Cry. CODE § 3294 (West 1970) provides: "In an action for the breach of an
obligation not arising from contract, where the defendant has been guilty of oppression,
fraud, or malice, express or implied, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may
recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant."
136. See, e.g., Whitfield Constr. Co. v. Commercial Dev. Corp., 392 F. Supp. 982 (D.V.I.
1975); Jones v. Abriani, 350 N.E.2d 635 (Ind. App. 1976); Lou Leventhal Auto Co. v.
Munns, 164 Ind. App. 368,328 N.E.2d 734 (1975); Rex Ins. Co. v. Baldwin, 323 N.E.2d 270
(Ind. App. 1975); Vernon Fire & Cas. Ins, Co. v. Sharp, 161 Ind. App. 413, 316 N.E.2d 381
(1974), modified on other grounds, 264 Ind. 599,349 N.E.2d 173 (1976); Eakman v. Robb,
237 N.W.2d 423 (N.D. 1975). See also Sullivan, supra note 3, at 245.
137. 350 N.E.2d 635 (Ind. App. 1976).
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failed to disclose the terms of the limited warranty on the mobile
home until the warranty had expired. Most of the defects were never
repaired despite the seller's continuous assurances, and additional
problems with the home arose.
Approving the jury's award of $3,000 in punitive damages, the
Indiana Court of Appeals noted that while the wrong committed was
a serious one and tortious in nature, it did not fit conveniently into
the framework of a recognized tort.138 Rather than demanding proof
of conduct that would constitute some independent tort, the court
asked whether public policy would be served by the imposition of
punitive damages.
The case at bar is a particularly appropriate instance
where the public interest is served by the punishment that is
inflicted on the wrongdoer. The damages awarded will tend to
deter similar conduct in the future against both this buyer and other
members of the public who deal with the seller.... In fact, it is hard
to imagine where the public interest to be served is more important
than in consumer matters, especially where the consumer is in an
inferior bargaining position and forced to either sign an adhesion
contract or do without the item desired. 39
The adoption of this public policy approach, which imposes punitive
damages for serious misconduct even if arising under contract, is
commendable. The imposition of punitive damages should not
depend on so fine a point as whether a case sounds in tort or in
contract, as distinctions between tort and contract actions frequently
are difficult to maintain.140 Further, punitive damages may be even
more important in a contract action than in a tort action, because of
the limitations of contract damages. If wrongdoers only have to fear a
measure of damages that would force them to do what was required
originally, there is little disincentive for delay and breach. This is
particularly true where the breaching party is in a position of
relatively strong bargaining power. Thus, compensatory damages in
contract cases have little effect in preventing economic oppression.
By strengthening the sanction against breach of contract, the
imposition of punitive damages operates to curb the abuse of superior
bargaining power.141
138. Id. at 650 (quoting Vernon Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 264 Ind. 599, 608, 349
N.E.2d 173,180 (1976)).
139. 350 N.E.2d at 650. Cf. Vernon Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 264 Ind. 599, 608, 349
N.E.2d 173, 180 (1976) ("serious wrong, tortious in nature," even if not "conveniently
fit[ting] the confines of a pre-determined tort," coupled with a public interest which is
"served by the deterrent effect" of punitive damages, justifies award).
140. See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 237, 251.
141. Id. at 249. The author also suggests that awarding punitive damages in contracts
cases is consonant with other doctrines of modern contract law, such as unconscionability,
that are designed to protect against the abuse of bargaining power. Id.
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Several writers have suggested that the trend toward imposing
punitive damages in contract cases reflects courts' efforts to protect
vulnerable parties against abuse of bargaining power by dominant
parties. 142 Although the subordinate party often will be a consumer
and the dominant party a large business concern, punitive damages
would be appropriate in any case in which the breaching party
consciously has sought to take advantage of the dependency that has
resulted from a contractual relationship. 143 As in tort cases, the
imposition of punitive damages should depend on whether the
conduct of the breaching party warrants the extra measure of
deterrence that punitive damages provide.144
Naturally punitive damages should not be used to discourage
parties to a contract from resorting to the courts for settlement of a
good faith dispute.1 45 The key factor, however, is good faith. If a
breaching party is unable to advance some reasonable basis in law or
in fact for failing to perform contractual obligations, an inference of
bad faith is unavoidable. When this bad faith is coupled with disparity
in bargaining power, the sanction of punitive damages is appropriate.
Effectuating a Principled Approach
As this discussion demonstrates, the doctrine of punitive
damages can be a valuable device for strengthening the admonitory
function of the civil law. The troublesome question is how to put the
theoretical goals of the doctrine into practice. How can a court ensure
that a blameworthy defendant will not be punished too harshly by an
inflamed jury? How, indeed, does a court determine the sum that will
effectively deter the defendant's conduct without bankrupting him or
her?
The easy answer is that the trial judge has the responsibility for
seeing that punitive damages are applied in a principled manner; yet
this job is far from easy. In a criminal trial, the trial judge at least has
the advantage of being guided by minimum and maximum penalties
established by the legislature. 46 Prior to sentencing criminal
defendants in most states, the judge may hold a special hearing in
142. See id. at 249-5 1; Punitive Damages in Contracts Actions, supra note 3, at 688.
143. See, e.g., Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Central Beverage Co., 359 N.E.2d 566, 579-81
(Ind. App. 1977) (brewer termination of distribution agreement with beer wholesaler). See
also Punitive Damages in Contract Actions, supra note 3, at 687, suggesting that
dependencies resulting from a contract may create a type of fiduciary relationship.
144. See notes 75-95 & accompanying text supra.
145. See Vernon Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 264 Ind. App. 599, 610, 349 N.E.2d 173,
181 (1976); Punitive Damages in Contract Actions, supra note 3, at 685, 687-88.
146. See Punishment by Civil Courts, supra note 14, at 1169-70.
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which additional information to guide in sentencing is received. 47 In a
civil trial in which punitive damages are sought, however, the judge
has no such guidance. Consequently, there is a danger that the
paucity of standards regarding punitive damages may cause the judge
to hesitate to disturb the jury's award, feeling that his or her judgment
is no better than the jury's."48
Two changes in present practice are necessary to strengthen
courts' control over punitive damages awards. The first relates to the
procedure for imposing punitive damages and the second to the
assessment of the amount of such damages.
Procedural Reform
A common practice among courts is to instruct the jury that it
may award punitive damages if it finds that the defendant's conduct
was outrageous and evidenced "evil motives or... reckless
indifference to the rights of others."' 49 The assessment of punitive
damages is then left to the discretion of the jury,150 subject to
remittitur or the granting of a new trial for excessive verdicts.151 One
writer has noted the inherent irony of requiring that the jury find the
defendant's conduct to be outrageous, while reversing the verdict if
the jury acts on this passionate emotion. 52
To increase the likelihood that punitive damages will be applied
in a principled manner, the judge, rather than the jury, should assess
the sum of the damages. 53 Although the judge is in no better position
to decide whether the defendant's conduct was outrageous, the
question of punishment calls for expertise. Delicate issues of
economics and social policy are involved in deciding the amount of
punishment-issues with which the ordinary juror is likely to have
147. Id. at 1170.
148. See Punitive Damages in Contact Actions, supra note 3, at 672.
149. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (Tent. Draft No. 19,1973).
150. See, e.g., Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Central Beverage Co., 359 N.E.2d 566, 581
(Ind. App. 1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (Tent. Draft No. 19,
1973).
151. See note 49 supra. See generally Carlin, Remittiturs and Additurs, 49 W. VA. L.
REV. 1 (1942).
152. Owen, supra note 6, at 1320 n.304.
153. The shifting of the assessment function to the judge has been suggested by
numerous commentators. See DOBBS, supra note 1, at 220; DuBois, Punitive Damages in
Personal Injury, Products Liability and Professional Malpractice Cases: Bonanza or
Disaster, 43 INS. COUNSEL J. 344, 352-53 (1976); Owen, supra note 6, at 1320-25;
Exemplary Damages, supra note 1, at 530; Punishment by Civil Courts, supra note 14, at
1171. It is also provided for in the Department of Commerce's Proposed Uniform Product
Liability Law. See DEP'T OF COMMERCE, DRAFT UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW §
120(b), 44 Fed. Reg. 3,002 (1979) [hereinafter cited as DRAFT UNIFORM PRODUCT
LIABILITY LAW].
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little familiarity.15 4 Beyond being more aware of the public policy
implications of the award of punitive damages, judges have more
experience in meting out punishment. 55 They are less likely to be
impressed by the histrionics of counsel and so to be inflamed by
passion or prejudice. Finally, the judge could receive additional
evidence, otherwise inadmissible or potentially prejudicial, to aid in
reaching an informed decision about the proper sum of damages.1 56
This procedure would parallel the present practice in criminal
trials in most states in which the sentence is imposed by the trial judge
after conviction by the jury.157 This bifurcation of the adjudication
and sentencing functions is designed to avoid the possibility that the
jury's determination of guilt would be influenced by evidence of the
defendant's character and personality. 58 Perhaps, too, the system was
structured to avoid situations in which a jury would compromise its
doubts about guilt with a light sentence.
This rationale would apply equally to a civil trial in which
punitive damages are sought. Much of the information that is needed
to impose a proper sum of damages may be too complex for the jury
to evaluate effectively. Evidence of the defendant's wealth, while
admissible in most states,159 may give rise to what one writer has
dubbed the "Robin Hood" syndrome.' 6° Similarly, evidence of past or
present criminal prosecution,' 6' or of other ongoing civil cases, 62 may
influence the jury and lead it to compromise any doubts it may have
on the initial question of liability. Yet all of this information is vital
for principled application of punitive damages. To avert the
154. See Morris, supra note 37, at 1179.
155. This experience stems largely from presiding over criminal proceedings. Owen,
supra note 6, at 1320.
156. Id. See notes 157-163 & accompanying text infra. The constitutionality of a
sentencing hearing in a criminal case, in which the judge received evidence outside the
record, has been upheld by the Supreme Court. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241
(1949).
157. See Punishment by Civil Courts, supra note 14, at 1171.
158. See G. MUELLER, SENTENCING PROCESS AND PURPOSE 3 (1977).
159. See, e.g., Coy v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 210, 373 P.2d 457, 23 Cal. Rptr. 393
(1962); Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Central Beverage Co., 359 N.E.2d 566, 581 (Ind. App.
1977); Hall v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 252 N.W.2d 421, 424 (Iowa 1977); Nelson v.
Halvorson, 117 Minn. 255, 135 N.W. 818 (1912). See generally Note, Punitive Damages:
An Exception to the Right of Privacy?: Coy v. Superior Court, 5 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 145
(1977).
160. DuBois, Punitive Damages in Personal Injury, Products Liability and Professional
Malpractice Litigation: Bonanza or Disaster, 43 INS. COUNSEL J. 344, 353 (1976). See also
Morris, supra note 37, at 1191; Owen, supra note 6, at 1320-21; Exemplary Damages, supra
note 1, at 528.
161. See Morris, supra note 37, at 1197.
162. See Rheingold, The MER129 Story-An Instance of Successful Mass Disaster
Litigation, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 116,136 n.53 (1968).
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possibilities of compromise and overly harsh penalties, the questions
of liability and punishment should be separated, and the judge
provided with access to information that would otherwise be
excluded.
If the record reasonably supports the inference that the
defendant's conduct warrants the imposition of punitive damages, the
jury should be instructed to decide whether punitive damages should
be awarded. Maintaining this decision as a jury function operates as a
check on the judge's decision and takes advantage of the jury's
knowledge of community standards. If the jury finds that punitive
damages should be awarded, the judge should then hold a special, in
camera hearing to assess the amount of the award.
During this hearing, the judge should hear any evidence outside
the record that would aid in assessing the amount of punitive
damages, unhampered by technical rules of evidence. After
considering all of the evidence and the policy factors outlined below,
the judge could then assess the amount of punitive damages. To
facilitate appellate review, a record should be made of this hearing,
including written findings of fact supporting the amount of the
award.163
Guidelines for Assessing the Amount of Punitive Damages
The problem with assessing punitive damages is that no
quantitative formula is possible, yet the judge must set a certain sum
that will effectuate the policy goals underlying punitive damages
awards.164 Although a quantitative formula would be comforting, it
would be undesirable. The deterrent effect of punitive damages
would be minimized if a person contemplating wrongful conduct
could gauge his or her maximum liability in advance. Similarly, any
uniformity in a sanction that strikes at wealth would pose the danger
of being excessive for poor defendants and inadequate for rich
ones. 65 Judgment calls in assessing punitive damages, therefore, are
inescapable.
Many courts have sought refuge behind the rule that the amount
of punitive damages must bear a reasonable relationship to actual
damages.1 66 This rule is artificial in that no specific ratio of punitive
163. An alternative procedure is possible for those jurisdictions that find a complete
shifting of the assessment function to be too radical. Evidence of the defendant's wealth,
criminal prosecutions, and ongoing multiple civil litigation could be presented to the jury
in open court after it has found that the defendant is liable and that punitive damages are
warranted. The judge could then reduce by remittitur any excessive verdicts. But see Note,
Mass Liability and Punitive Damages Overkill, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1797,1806-08 (1979).
164. See Owen, supra note 6, at 1315.
165. See Punishment by Civil Courts, supra note 14, at 1170.
166. See, e.g., Schroeder v. Auto Driveaway Co., 11 Cal. 3d 908, 922,523 P.2d 662, 672,
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damages to actual damages ever has been established. 67 In one
jurisdiction, for example, ratios have been upheld that ranged
between 0. 18 to 1 and 12.5 to 1.168 The greater danger of the
reasonable relationship rule is that it can cut against the deterrent
objective of punitive damages. 169 There are many cases in which,
although actual damage is slight, the conduct involved has such great
potential to cause harm that strong sanctions are warranted. For
example, a person may attempt murder but only succeed in
frightening the victim, 170 or a seller may commit a host of petty
wrongs against consumers. Because the actual damages in such cases
are small, a rule that requires punitive damages to correspond to
compensatory damages would cause the award to fall short of its
desired effect. The reasonable relationship rule is meaningless and
should be abandoned.' 7'
The abandonment of the reasonable relationship rule would not
mean that the assessment of punitive damages would be thrown to
the gods. Rather, courts would be forced to balance society's interests
against the defendant's interests. The following factors may aid a
court in this process.
Severity of Threatened Harm. Punitive damages should bear a
reasonable relationship to the harm that is likely to occur from the
defendant's conduct, 72 as well as to the harm that actually has
occurred. If the harm likely to occur or the harm that has occurred
from such conduct is slight, the award of punitive damages should be
relatively small. If the threatened or actual harm is grievous, the
amount of the award should be more severe. 73 This is certainly not a
complete standard, for if present intangible harms are difficult to
gauge, potential harms are impossible to gauge with certainty.
Nevertheless, the severity of harm, actual and threatened, is one
factor that a court should consider in assessing punitive damages.174
114 Cal. Rptr. 622, 632 (1974); Addair v. Huffman, 195 S.E.2d 739, 743-44 (W. Va. 1973).
For an excellent discussion of the reasonable relationship rule, see Morris, supra note 37,
at 1180-81.
167. See Riley, supra note 61, at 216.
168. Id. at 216-17.
169. See DOBBS, supra note 1, at 210-11; Exemplary Damages, supra note 1, at 531;
Punishment by Civil Courts, supra note 14, at 1170-71.
170. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908, Comment (b) (Tent. Draft No. 19,
1973).
171. See Morris, supra note 37, at 1181-85; see generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 14 (4th ed. 1971); Riley, supra note 61, at 249.
172. See Morris, supra note 37, at 1181.
173. Id.
174. A recently enacted Minnesota statute identifies "the seriousness of hazard to the
public arising from the defendant's misconduct" as one of the factors to be considered in
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Degree of Reprehensibility of Defendant's Conduct. As the
defendant's misconduct becomes more flagrant, the need to deter
such conduct increases. In determining the need for deterrence, the
court should focus on such elements as the duration of the
misconduct, the degree of the defendant's awareness of the hazard,
and any concealment of the hazard.175 In addition, both the existence
and the frequency of similar past conduct would be relevant.
Profitability of the Conduct. Where the defendant has engaged in
wrongful conduct for a profit, the award of punitive damages should
remove the profit incentive. 176 Not only should the defendant be
forced to disgorge the profits, but an additional amount should be
added to the award so that the defendant realizes not a profit, but a
loss. 177
Financial Position of the Defendant. Because the award of
punitive damages strikes at wealth, the defendant's ability to pay
must be taken into account.178 A sum that is sizable for one person
may be inconsequential to another. To accomplish the goal of
deterrence, the sum assessed must be large enough to punish the
defendant without being vindictive.
Amount of Compensatory Damages Assessed. The judge must
scrutinize the jury's compensatory award to determine whether it
contains elements of retribution. If the compensatory award seems
high in relation to actual injury, the jury's outrage at the defendant's
conduct may have spilled over into the compensatory award. If so,
this fact should mitigate the amount of punitive damages.
Costs of Litigation. Since one purpose of punitive damages is to
encourage plaintiffs to bring wrongdoers to justice, the judge should
consider the costs of such litigation to the plaintiff.179 This factor is
related to the foregoing one, in that the plaintiff may have been
compensated indirectly for costs through a large compensatory
verdict.
Potential Criminal Sanctions. Any criminal penalties to which the
assessing punitive damages. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20(3) (West Supp. 1978).
175. See, e.g., id.; DRAFT UNIFORM PRODUCr LIABILITY LAW, supra note 153, §
120(b)(2), (4) & (5). See also Owen, supra note 6, at 1319.
176. See Owen, supra note 6, at 1316.
177. See note 89 supra.
178. See DRAFt UNIFORM PRODUCr LIABILITY LAW, supra note 153, § 120(b)(6);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20(3) (West Supp. 1978); Owen, supra note 6, at 1319; Exemplary
Damages, supra note 1, at 528; Punishment by Civil Courts, supra note 14, at 1170. See
note 159 & accompanying text supra.
179. See Owen, supra note 6, at 1315, 1319. But see Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13
How.) 363,371 (185 1).
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defendant may be subject should be taken into account in mitigation
of the punitive damages award.180 If the defendant is being prosecuted
for a crime that carries a serious penalty, such as substantial loss of
liberty, society's interests probably are best vindicated by the criminal
system.181 Punitive damages in such a case probably should not be
levied at all. In other cases involving criminal misconduct in which
punitive damages are appropriate, the judge should consider the total
effect of the punishment to which the defendant will be subjected.182
Other Civil Actions Against the Defendant Based on the Same
Conduct. Imposing punitive damages in multiple party or mass
disaster litigation has been the source of much concern.18 3 Several
dangers are inherent in such cases. Courts are concerned not only
with the possibility that the defendant will be too harshly punished,'84
but also with the danger that the first plaintiffs receiving judgments
will deplete the resources available for future litigants. 8 5 The
suggestion that an escrow fund be created for all litigants to share
equally 8 6 does not seem practical.'87 On the other hand, if punitive
damages were abolished in such cases, the result would be that "an
entirely culpable defendant is relieved of civil punitive awards when
he injures many people, though he would be held liable if he had
injured only one."' 88
The best approach in this problematic area would be similar to
that taken in cases in which the defendant is subject to criminal
punishment. The judge should assess punitive damages in view of the
total punishment to which the defendant is subject,189 giving more
weight to prior awards.190 Moreover, as between multiple plaintiffs in
such litigation, one author has suggested that initial plaintiffs deserve
180. See notes 115-18 & accompanying text supra.
181. Cf Punishment by Civil Courts, supra note 14, at 1174-75 (criminal penalty should
abolish punitive damages).
182. See DRAFT UNIFORM PRODUCr LIABILITY LAW, supra note 153, § 120(b)(7);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20(3) (West Supp. 1978); Owen, supra note 6, at 1319.
183. See, e.g., Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967);
DOBBS, supra note 1, at 212-14; W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at
13 (4th ed. 1971); Morris, supra note 37, at 1194-95; Owen, supra note 6, at 1322-25.
184. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F. 2d 832,839-51 (2d Cir. 1967).
185. Id. at 839-41.
186. See Gilden, Punitive Damages in Implied Private Actions for Fraud Under the
Securities Laws, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 646, 657 n.77 (1970).
187. See deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223,1232 (10th Cir. 1970).
188. DOBBS, supra note 1, at 213-14.
189. See note 182 & accompanying text supra.
190. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908, Comment (e) (Tent. Draft No.
19,1973); Note, Mass Liability and Punitive Damages Overkill, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1797
(1979).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50
any disproportionate award they may receive, because of the greater
cost and ingenuity required of them.'91 This position has merit,
particularly in view of the fact that subsequent plaintiffs may benefit,
either by favorable settlements or by favorable jury verdicts, from the
efforts of the frontrunners.192
Conclusion
The doctrine of punitive damages has for too long been a bane of
the common law-misunderstood, disavowed, and disfavored. The
doctrine must be forthrightly recognized for what it is: a powerful tool
to be used in the civil law's job of controlling conduct. The doctrine
has not outlived its usefulness. In a society that becomes increasingly
impersonal and increasingly dominated by large business concerns,
which are in many ways beyond the law, there will always be the need
for a remedy that increases the existing admonitory function of the
civil law.
Nevertheless, the very power of the remedy demands. that judges
exercise close control over the imposition and assessment of punitive
damages. To exercise meaningful control, judges need meaningful
standards. Although punitive damages will never be susceptible to lit-
mus paper tests or mathematical formulas, a consideration of the
composite of factors outlined herein will aid a court in ensuring that
punitive damages will be imposed only when justified by the policies
underlying the doctrine.
191. Owen, supra note 6, at 1325.
192 Id.
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